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Abstract 
Over the last six decades, the Supreme Court of India has created and re-created a right to property 
from very weak textual sources, despite constitutional declarations calling for social revolution, 
numerous amendments to reverse key judgments and even, in 1978, the repeal of the core 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to property. This Article challenges the usual account 
of these developments. The primary contention is that the 1978 repeal is much less significant than it 
appears, due to the Court’s creative interpretation of other constitutional provisions. The Supreme 
Court has consistently advanced liberal models of constitutionalism and property, despite the 
influence of other models on the original constitutional design and later amendments. This Article 
also examines whether the Court’s liberalism is compatible with the egalitarian values of the 
Constitution, and how its position will affect attempts to address social issues relating to the 
distribution of property in India. 
 
 
At first glance, the constitutional history of the Indian right to property seems to have 
followed a dramatic arc from independence through to its demise in 1978. The 
Constituent Assembly incorporated a right to property in the original Constitution, 
although in a form that was believed to exclude judicial review of compensation. Initially, 
the Supreme Court adopted an interpretive strategy of expanding and defending the right 
to property, even in the face of constitutional declarations calling for social revolution 
and several amendments aimed at reversing key judgments. Eventually, the story came to 
an end with the enactment of the Forty-Fourth Amendment in 1978, with its deletion of 
the core provisions that protected property as one of the Constitution’s fundamental 
rights. Since then, there have been calls for the restoration of property as a fundamental 
right, but nothing of significance has been done to reverse the Amendment. 
This article challenges this account on several points. The primary contention is that 
the Forty-Fourth Amendment is much less significant than it appears. It has had little 
impact on property relations in India, as the Supreme Court has ensured that other 
constitutional provisions provide a right to property that is at least as strong as it ever 
was, and certainly stronger than it was immediately before the Amendment. It has done 
this through a creative and expansive interpretation of constitutional provisions that were 
not intended to restrict the legislature’s powers over property. Over the long term, the 
Supreme Court never let go of its conviction that the Indian constitutional order is, above 
all, based on liberal values that include the property rights of the individual. To be sure, 
there have been occasional judgments that go against the trend, but over the longer term, 
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the Court has preferred the liberal models of constitutionalism and property to social 
democrat or socialist models.  
The story of the right to property from independence to 1978 has been covered in 
detail by other scholars.
1
 This article reviews the pre-repeal developments briefly, before 
moving to the Supreme Court’s position on property since the repeal. It begins in the 
1980’s, with the rise of the public interest litigation and the movement of the Supreme 
Court’s position on property and access to resources away from the classic liberalism of 
the earlier period. In many ways, the Court’s judgments reflected socialist and social 
democrat values. However, with the liberalisation of the economy that gathered strength 
through the 1990’s, the Court revived the liberal model of constitutional property through 
a series of complex doctrinal developments. The article explains these developments, and 
sets them against the current political directions in India. The article closes with a 
discussion of the place of a right to property within a political and constitutional system 
that struggles to address issues of social justice.  
It is hoped that the article will help to stimulate academic inquiry on these issues. 
Although recent developments are significant, and have been noted in the media, they 
have not captured the attention in the academic literature. Indeed, several recent analyses 
of the right to property have not discussed the revival of the right to property.
2
 Perhaps 
this is not surprising: as the article recognises, the right to property is not a fundamental 
right within the Constitution. Without status as a fundamental right, it lacks the rhetorical 
and symbolic impact that might otherwise command attention. Moreover, the political 
context has shifted. Economic liberalisation means that the image of conflict between 
private property and the State has been supplanted by one of co-operation (legal or 
otherwise).
3
 Nevertheless, the revival of the right to property is itself an important and 
still incomplete chapter in Indian constitutional history. 
 
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN INDIA 
                                                 
1
  Granville AUSTIN, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1966) at 84-99 [Austin, Cornerstone]; Granville AUSTIN, Working a Democratic Constitution: 
A History of the Indian Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) [Austin, Working]; H.C.L. 
MERILLAT, “The Indian Constitution: Property Rights and Social Reform” (1960) 21 Ohio State Law 
Journal 616 [Merillat, “Constitution”]; H.C.L. MERILLAT, Land and the Constitution in India (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1970) [Merillat; Land]; Mohammed IMAM, “Changing Contours of 
Right to Compensation: Part I” (1970) 5(19) Economic and Political Weekly 779; Mohammed IMAM, 
“Changing Contours of Right to Compensation: Part II” (1970) 5(20) Economic and Political Weekly 
812; R. S. GAE, “Land Law in India: With Special Reference to the Constitution” (1973) 22 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 312. 
2
  See e.g. Shruti RAJAGOPALAN, Economic Analysis of Amendments to the Indian Constitution (Ph.D. 
thesis, George Mason University, 2013), online: <http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/handle/1920/8223> (the 
frequent amendment of the Constitution, especially in relation to property, undermines the rule of law 
and ultimately the prospects for economic growth; the analysis does not consider the relevance of 
Article 300A); Priya S. GUPTA, “The Peculiar Circumstances of Eminent Domain in India” (2012) 49 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 445 at 449 (referring to “the absence of constitutional protection for property 
rights”). See also A.K. GANGULI, “Right to Property: Its Evolution and Constitutional Development in 
India” (2006) 48 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 489 at 521-523. 
3
  See Namita WAHI, “Land Acquisition, Development and the Constitution” Seminar Magazine 
(February 2013), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222321>. See also the general discussion 
below at Part III. 
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Three very different views on the place of private property in the new constitutional order 
emerged during the debates in the Constituent Assembly.
4
 The first followed the classic 
liberal view of property and the constitution. A number of Assembly members spoke in 
favor of including a right to property, with a guarantee of full compensation on 
expropriation, within the bill of rights that would form Part III of the new Constitution.
5
 
Moreover, they argued that the compensation guarantee should apply to all classes of 
owners and types of property, irrespective of the type of property, the wealth or status of 
the landowner, or the purpose served by the taking.
6
 At the other extreme, the socialists in 
the Assembly questioned the place of a right to property amongst the fundamental rights, 
and were especially concerned that a guarantee of full compensation could make 
redistribution and nationalisation unaffordable.
7
 They argued that a right to property 
should go no further than ensuring that public officials stayed within the scope of a 
defined statutory authority.
8
   
The final and largest group believed that India needed a planned economy and a strong 
state sector, but within a system that still had a role for private capital. This group 
included most of the Congress leadership.
9
 They shared the concern of European social 
democrats that the business cycles of an unregulated market put individuals and 
communities at risk.
10
 They did not, however, incorporate social democrat values based 
on ideas of social obligation and solidarity into the conception of property of 
constitutional law, as would be seen in countries such as the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy.
 11
 Instead, the constitutional provisions on property were intended to 
leave the legislature with the discretion to implement socialist and social democrat 
policies, including ideas of social obligation.
12
 As originally drafted, Article 31(1) 
                                                 
4
  The Constituent Assembly was convened in 9 December 1946; the Constitution was agreed on 26 
November 1949 and took effect on 26 January 1950. On the right to property, see Austin, Cornerstone, 
supra note 1 at 84-99; Merillat, Constitution, supra note 1. 
5
  E.g. Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX, 1249-50 (Jaspat Roy Kapoor), 1250-51 (K.T.M. Ahmed 
Ibrahim) and 1255 (Prabhu Dayal Himatsingka) (10 September 1949).  
6
  E.g. ibid., vol. IX, 1271-73 (Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga) (12 September 1949). 
7
  E.g. ibid., vol. IX, 1201-06 (Prof Shibban Lal Saksena) (10 September 1949). 
8
  E.g. ibid., vol. IX, 1253-54 (Guptanath Singh) (10 September 1949). 
9
  The two leaders of Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel are sometimes described 
as socialist and pro-business, respectively. However, by the time the Constituent Assembly had 
convened, Nehru had become more moderate (see infra notes 27-35). Patel said little about his 
economic views in the Assembly, except that he did not support full compensation in every case: see 
Austin, Cornerstone, supra note 1 at 43 n. 73. See generally Richard SANDBROOK et al., Social 
Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 12-64; cf. Rajagopalan, supra note 2 at 92: “The vast 
majority of the Constituent Assembly were socialists.” (Note that Rajagopalan does not distinguish 
between socialism and social democracy.) 
10
  See Sheri BERMAN, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
11
  See Tom ALLEN, “Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights” (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1055 [Allen, 
“Liberalism”]; Gregory S. ALEXANDER, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The 
German Example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733. 
12
  For an economic analysis of the reasons for taking this position, see Rajagopalan, supra note 2 at 66-83. 
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provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”, 
while Article 31(2) provides that: 
 
[n]o property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any 
commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes 
under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides 
for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the 
compensation, or specifies the principle on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to 
be determined and given. 
 
Article 31(3) also required Presidential assent for State land reform legislation, thereby 
providing an additional measure of control, albeit through the national executive rather 
than the judiciary.
13
 As most legislation would emanate from the State legislatures, the 
President, as advised by the national Cabinet, would be able to exercise a form of review 
over takings. It therefore appeared that Article 31(2) did not allow the courts to review 
the basis for compensation, but they could at least ensure that the legislature had 
addressed the question. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister, informed the Constituent 
Assembly that "[e]minent lawyers have told us that on a proper construction of this 
clause, normally speaking, the Judiciary should not and does not come in."
14
 The courts 
would become involved only where "there has been a gross abuse of the law, where, in 
fact, there has been a fraud on the Constitution."
15
 
It seemed that the right to property would give the legislature considerable flexibility, 
even to the point of allowing a taking of property for less than full compensation. 
However, it did not require India or the States to enact socialist or social democrat laws. 
As Uday S. Mehta has argued, providing a constitutional structure that would enable and 
even require social progress was a core theme of the Constituent Assembly debates.
16
 
Ultimately, this was expressed primarily through Part IV of the Constitution, entitled the 
“Directive Principles of State Policy”. The Directive Principles require the India and the 
States to “secure a social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people”, with a 
“social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the 
institutions of the national life”.17 They were also required to bring about a more 
egalitarian society,
18
 with a distribution of resources that would “subserve the common 
good”19 in a system that “does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of 
production to the common detriment”.20 Social provisioning was important, with 
Directive Principles requiring health care, education, and public assistance.
21
 However, 
the Constitution also declared that the Principles “shall not be enforceable by any court”, 
                                                 
13
  The Constitution did not set out any principles on which assent would be granted or denied: see Austin, 
Working, supra note 1 at 83-87.  
14
  Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX, 1195 (10 September 1949). 
15
  Ibid. 
16
  Uday S. MEHTA, “Constitutionalism” in Niraja Gopal JAYAL and Pratap Bhanu MEHTA, eds., The 
Oxford Companion to Politics in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 15. 
17
  The Constitution of India, art. 38(1) [Constitution].  
18
  Ibid., art. 38(2). 
19
  Ibid., art. 39(b). 
20
  Ibid., art. 39(c). 
21
  Ibid., arts. 41, 45. 
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even though they were “fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the 
duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.”22  
By the usual account of events, a liberal Supreme Court soon came into conflict with 
the socialist leadership of the Congress Party over the scope of judicial review.
23
 This 
played itself out in cases in which the Court would assert that the right to property 
required full compensation, only to find that Parliament would pass a constitutional 
amendment that would cut back the Court’s review powers.24  
This perception of neutrality dissolved as the conflict over property developed into a 
larger conflict over the separation of powers. In 1967, in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 
the Supreme Court declared that Parliament did not have the power to enact amendments 
that would alter the ‘basic features” or “basic structure” of the Constitution.25 
Accordingly, the right to property could not be subject to further amendment. Parliament 
rejected the Supreme Court’s position; further amendments and cases followed, 
culminating with the landmark case Kesavananda v. State of Kerala.
26
 The Court 
affirmed the basic structure doctrine, although it also held that amendments would be 
acceptable if they did not destroy the “essence” of the right. 
In some ways, it is surprising that there was conflict between the Court and 
Parliament. The rhetoric of the Congress leadership was often socialist, but it tended to 
assume that economic growth and the ending of colonial privileges would improve the 
position of the poor without the direct redistribution of wealth. Policies rarely addressed 
education or health directly; more generally, there was no attention to the ideas of social 
provisioning that were part of European social democracies. Indeed, nationalism, rather 
than egalitarianism or redistribution, tended to dominate economic policy.
27
 Successive 
five-year plans focused on achieving greater self-reliance through the development of 
industrial capacity aimed at import substitution.
28
 In practice, this required close co-
operation between private capital and the State, alongside policies aimed at the expansion 
of the state sector. To be sure, some national policies did increase state control over the 
private sector, but Vivek Chibber argues that the overall picture is one in which Nehru’s 
government worked closely with business interests: “Almost every major body set up to 
design policy and new state institutions in the aftermath of Independence was dominated 
                                                 
22
  Ibid., arts. 37. 
23
  The Court portrayed itself as following a positivist ideology of judging, especially in relation to the 
meaning of “compensation”. To some extent this has been accepted by scholars, but it was rejected by 
the Congress leadership: see the overview in Lavanya RAJAMANI and Arghya SENGUPTA, “The 
Supreme Court of India” in Niraja Gopal JAYAL and Pratap Bhanu MEHTA, eds., The Oxford 
Companion to Politics in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 80 at 80-83.  
24
  See the material cited supra note 1. 
25
  Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 1967 SCR (2) 762. 
26
  Kesavananda v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
27
  Vijay JOSHI and I.M.D. LITTLE, India Macroeconomics and Political Economy 1964-1991 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 22. 
28
  See Baldev Raj NAYAR, “State Entrepreneurship in the Nehru Era: Ideology vs Necessity” in Ram 
JOSHI and R.K. HEBSUR, eds., Congress in Indian Politics: A Centenary Perspective 
(London: Sangam, 1987) 204 at 204.  
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by business leaders.”29 Indeed, business leaders often favoured strong intervention as a 
means of obtaining subsidies, licenses and other forms of protection from competition 
(especially from international competition).
30
  Ideas of radical reform surfaced in some 
election campaigns, but they rarely had lasting impact on property. Cases striking down 
economic legislation were legally and constitutionally significant, but they were not 
commercially significant, and they certainly did not compromise the growing 
relationships between commercial interests and the government. Congress and the Court 
did not agree on the nature of the right to property, but their conflict had limited impact 
on many key economic policies. Moreover, given the lack of any movement in national 
politics on redistribution and social provisioning, it is not that surprising that the Supreme 
Court also failed to advance similar ideas in its interpretation of the right to property.  
Even in relation to land reform – a central issue for many decades – Congress often 
seemed reluctant to take action. The first phase of land reform, involving the abolition of 
the zamindari system, was largely complete by 1960.
31
 However, there was very little 
progress on other aspects of reform, especially in relation to the redistribution of land. 
Indeed, Congress had largely distanced itself from redistribution by the time of Golak 
Nath.
32
 For the most part, the upper caste landowners and wealthy peasants had sufficient 
influence at the local and regional level to undermine any effort to transfer land or power 
to the peasants.
33
 The Congress leadership was nothing if not pragmatic: as long as the 
landed elite could deliver electoral success, carrying through on redistribution was 
unnecessary. Some disenchanted members of Congress made proposals for redistribution 
at the Nagpur annual meeting of Congress in 1959, but they were blocked by the 
wealthier peasants who had benefited from the zamindari reforms.
34
 This was the pattern 
throughout this period: 
 
The very institutions that were supposed to implement government policy – the Congress party 
machine and the local state organizations – were thoroughly penetrated by groups hostile to agrarian 
policy. Even the halting attempts at reform tried by Nehru foundered against their resistance.
35
  
 
                                                 
29
  Vivek CHIBBER, “Organized Interests, Development Strategies, and Social Policies” in R. NAGARAJ, 
ed., Growth, Inequality and Social Development in India: Is Inclusive Growth Possible? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 168at 174.  
30
  Vivek CHIBBER and Adaner USMANI, “The State and the Capitalist Class in India” in Atul KOHLI 
and Prerna SINGH, eds., Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics (London: Routledge, 2013) 204 at 204; 
they also remark that the large public sector was “designed to function at the service of the private 
sector…Planning was the means by which state assistance to private capital would be effectively 
coordinated.” Ibid. at 206. 
31
  Hung-Chao TAI, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis (London: University of California 
Press, 1974) at 214-18. 
32
  Ibid. at 218. 
33
  A.M. KHUSRO, “Land Reforms Since Independence” in V. B. SINGH, ed., Economic History of India: 
1857-1956 (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1965, reprinted 2002); Tai, supra note 31 at 93-97. 
34
  John HARRISS, “Politics and Redistribution in India” in Kohli and Singh, eds., supra note 30, 211 
[Harriss, “Politics”]; Frederick G. BAILEY, “Politics and Society in Contemporary Orissa” in C.H. 
PHILIPS, ed., Politics and Society in India (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963) 97 ; Atul KOHLI, “State 
and Redistributive Development in India” in Nagaraj, ed., supra note 29, 168 at 187. 
35
  Vivek CHIBBER, Organized Interests, Development Strategies, and Social Policies, in Nagaraj, ed., 
supra note 29, 168at 170. 
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Hence, Golak Nath and Kesavananda may have appeared to obstruct the aims of 
Congress, especially as both cases related to land redistribution, but they supported the 
interests of groups that saw the Congress Party as their natural home. The various 
amendments aimed at restricting the right to property were, in many respects, of limited 
importance to their supposed beneficiaries. 
Regardless of the gulf between reality and perception, there is no doubt that, by the 
1970’s, the Supreme Court was seen as an obstacle to reform. Not surprisingly, Golak 
Nath had become a target of criticism from Indira Gandhi and the left wing of Congress, 
especially as Chief Justice Subba Rao left the Court two months later to run for the post 
of President of India with the conservative Swatantra Party.
36
 By the 1976 election, the 
situation had reached the point that the manifesto of the newly-founded Janata Party 
called for the deletion of the right to property in favor of a right to employment.
37 
The 
Court had already indicated that it would not block a repeal, as a slim majority in 
Kesavananda held that the right to property was not part of the Constitution’s basic 
structure. Although some Janata members saw the repeal as a necessary step toward 
socialism,
38
 Shanti Bhushan, the Law Minister, made it clear that the intention was not to 
abolish private property or private capital. However, he also stated that: 
 
in a poor country like India where large masses of the people are not propertied people and where 
only a comparatively small section of the people has property, right to property should not be 
regarded as fundamental right acting as a restriction on the powers of the Parliament and the elected 
representatives of the people.
39
 
 
Indeed, he was concerned that giving property the elevated status of a fundamental right 
had prevented legislatures from ensuring that “property is used as a medium for doing 
public good to the people of the country as a whole.”40 
In response to a question in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house) about the risks that 
repealing the right to property might hold for property owners who were not wealthy, 
Bhushan said that “[a]s far as small holders are concerned…democracy itself is the best 
safeguard for the protection of their rights to property.”41 The Forty-Fourth Amendment 
therefore repealed the provisions that had guaranteed compensation, but added a new 
Article 300A. However, the new provision stated only that: "[n]o person shall be 
deprived of his property save by authority of law.”42 Significantly, Article 300A lies 
outside Part III of the Constitution and hence it is not a fundamental right. As such, the 
two central attributes of fundamental rights – that they cannot be taken away or 
                                                 
36
  Rajamani and Sengupta, supra note 23 at 84; Manoj MATE, “Priests in the Temple of Justice: The 
Indian Legal Complex and the Basic Structure Doctrine” in Terence C. HALLIDAY, Lucien KARPIK, 
and Malcolm M. FEELEY, eds., Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: The Politics 
of the Legal Complex (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 112 at 124.  
37
  Janata Party Manifesto (1977) 4(9) Executive Intelligence Review Asia 5.  
38
  E.g. Rajya Sabha, 8 November 1976, col. 119 (Indradeep Sinha); Rajya Sabha, 8 November 1976, col. 
130 (Maqsood Ali Khan); 8 November 1976, col. 182 (Saraswati Pradhan).  
39
  Ibid., 28 August 1978, col. 54. 
40
  Ibid. 
41
  Ibid., 28 August 1978, col. 55. 
42
  Ibid., 28 August 1978, col. 54.  
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contravened by any law,
43
 and petitioners have a right of direct access to the Supreme 
Court for their vindication
44
 – would not apply. Since then, it has been assumed that India 
does not have a constitutional right to property; or, to put it more accurately, it has been 
assumed that legislation cannot be declared unconstitutional on the sole ground that it 
does not provide adequate compensation for the taking of property. 
 
II. THE REVIVAL OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
A. Doctrinal Developments 
 
The repeal of the right to property was not taken as a licence to expropriate without 
compensation. However, it did bring an end to the conflict between the judges and 
legislators over the scope of judicial review, at least in relation to property. This was 
partly due to a shift in the political landscape. The 1980 election saw a movement back to 
the center, with Congress (I) campaigning on a commitment to improving administration 
and reducing corruption. Under Indira Gandhi, and then Rajiv Gandhi, economic policy 
moved away from the system of licensing and protection that had prevailed under 
previous governments.
45
 Politically, Congress found it prudent to avoid the politics of 
property: it did not seek to reinstate the right to property; neither did it put forward 
policies that might have threatened property.  
The Court adjusted its focus away from the review of economic legislation to the 
review of administrative action and public interest litigation.
46
 Instead of concentrating 
on a liberal conception of property and equality, it began to show more interest in 
directing administrative bodies to take action to support the poor. Nevertheless, the 
groundwork for the revival of the right to property was laid in this period. Arguments for 
a revival of a right to property were put forward and tested; in general, they were 
dismissed by the courts, but nonetheless the judgments gave property owners enough 
hope to continue to argue for a restoration of a right to property that would ensure that no 
taking could occur without full compensation.  
One line of argument looked to the other fundamental rights as a source of protection 
for property. To some extent, the Court had already established that some other rights 
were relevant to property. The right to equality, contained in Article 14, had been applied 
to strike down takings where compensation principles appeared to vary between property 
owners.
47
 Article 19(1)(g) protected against unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry 
                                                 
43
  Constitution, supra note 17, art. 13(2). 
44
  Ibid., art. 32. 
45
  Joshi and Little, supra note 27 at 58-65; John ARMOUR and Priya LELE, “Law, Finance, and Politics: 
The Case of India” (2009) 43 Law and Society Review 491; R. NAGARAJ, “India’s Economic 
Development” in Kohli and Singh, eds., supra note 30, 189. 
46
  See Upendra BAXI, “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India” (1982) 29 Review of the International Commission of Jurists 37.  
47
  E.g. Maharahadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh Darghanga v. State of Bihar, AIR 1951 Patna 91, aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part State of Bihar v. Maharahadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh Darghanga, (1952) 1975 
AIR 1083 [Kameshwar Singh]; P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras, 1965 SCR 
(1) 614. 
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on a business.
48
 The potential for utilising other fundamental rights in defence of property 
was greatly increased with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.
49
 This case came under 
Article 21, which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law." The Court recognised that the 
provision was originally intended to apply only to matters of procedure. Nevertheless, it 
held that the right to personal liberty included a substantive element.
 50
 Accordingly, the 
grounds for a deprivation of liberty also had to be fair, just and reasonable.  
By itself, the majority judgment gave heart to those who wished to read substantive 
obligations into other rights. Even stronger was the concurring judgment of Bhagwati J. 
He stated that Article 14 implicitly provides a right not to be subject to the arbitrary or 
unreasonable exercise of state power.
51
 In his view, a law that did not provide equal 
treatment would necessarily be arbitrary in some way, and an arbitrary law was bound to 
produce some form of unequal treatment at some time.  
Both the majority and the concurring judgments described the substantive content in 
terms that suggested that the interpretation of fundamental rights would not turn on the 
intricate logic of the construction of detailed provisions. It was the broad sweep of the 
judgments that was attractive: whether an interference with individual rights had to be 
“fair, just and reasonable”, or neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, it seemed that the Court 
was willing to re-examine the way in which it had constructed rights in the past. From 
this, it seemed at least arguable that the new interpretation of Articles 14 or 21 could be 
extended to expand the scope of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).
52
  
The Court considered this point in Minerva Mills v. Union of India.
53
 The petitioner 
argued that the compensation paid on the nationalisation of its spinning mills was 
inadequate to the point that the relevant statutory provisions were arbitrary and contrary 
to Article 14.
54
 In effect, it was attempting to use Article 14 to do the work of a right to 
property, as Bhagwati J’s obiter dicta suggested it could. Ultimately, the Court dismissed 
its claim on the facts, but without indicating whether it would uphold a similar argument 
on different facts.
55
 
The case is better known for its analysis of the basic structure doctrine. However, the 
relevant statute included a declaration that it was enacted in furtherance of the Directive 
Principles. By the Forty-Second Amendment,
56
 Article 31C excluded judicial review 
from any statute with such a declaration. The case therefore raised two issues: whether 
Article 14 could be used to challenge a taking, and if so, whether Article 31C was 
effective to exclude judicial review.
 
 
                                                 
48
  Constitution, supra note 17, arts. 30(1A) and 30A(1) were also relevant, as they contained guarantees of 
compensation for takings in specific circumstances. 
49
  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 621. 
50
  See Manoj MATE, “The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty 
and Preventive Detention Cases” (2012) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 216.  
51
  See also Bhagwati, J in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, 1979 
SCR (3) 1014 at 1031-32 (the principle of non-arbitrariness is also part of the general principles of the 
rule of law). 
52
  See generally e.g. ibid.  
53
  Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (1) 206.  
54
  Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, No. 57 of 1974. 
55
  Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1986 SCR (3) 718.  
56
  Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 4.  
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A leading constitutional scholar, H.M. Seervai, put forward a second argument in 
favor of an implied right to property. His argument followed from India’s federal 
structure. Article 246 allocates legislative powers to each of Parliament and the state 
legislatures, as set out in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 42 of List III of 
the Schedule provides that Parliament and the state legislatures are competent to legislate 
for the “acquisition and requisitioning of property”. Seervai argued that Entry 42 
embodied the power of eminent domain, which could only be understood as a power to 
acquire only for a public purpose and on payment of compensation.
57
 Hence, a taking 
would not have statutory authority if it were not for a public purpose or accompanied by 
compensation; as such, it would be contrary to Article 300A.  
Another leading scholar, Durga Das Basu, challenged Seervai on the basis that the 
constitutional language was clear:
58
 if the relevant legislation did not provide 
compensation “the validity of such law cannot be challenged before the superior Courts 
on the ground that no compensation has been paid or made payable by such law.”59 
Furthermore, he argued that there is no authority for reading Entry 42 as the power of 
eminent domain, or even for supposing that the principles of eminent domain are part of 
Indian constitutional law. As he put it, Seervai’s argument to the contrary is “an 
astounding proposition.”60  
The lower courts, like the scholars, were divided on the effect of Article 300A. In 
1980, the Gujarat High Court gave a very clear statement against reading substantive 
guarantees into Article 300A: 
 
It is difficult to imagine how constitutional challenge under Article 300A can be raised. It is a very 
simple Article which can hardly be pressed into service for challenging any statute…It affords 
constitutional protection to a right to property which a statute recognizes. If a statute does not 
recognize a right to property, Article 300A cannot be invoked. Much less, therefore, any provision 
of the impugned Act can be challenged under Article 300A.
61
  
 
In a similar vein, the Rajasthan High Court held that price controls did not violate Article 
300A, simply because the controls had statutory backing. The fairness of the controls did 
not enter into the question.
62
  
The Bombay High Court took the opposite line in Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan v. 
State Of Maharashtra, as it declared that the Forty-Fourth Amendment was not intended 
to take away the “natural right to hold property.”63 If the Constitution allowed a taking 
                                                 
57
  M. SEERVAI, Constitutional Law of India, 4
th
 ed (Bombay: NM Tripathi, 1991-1993) vol. 2 at 1354-
427; see also H.M. JAIN, “The Forty Fourth Amendment and the Right to Property” (1979) 13 Journal 
of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies 23.  
58
  Durga Das BASU, Shorter Constitution of India, 12
th
 ed (New Delhi: Wadhwa, 1996 reprint 1999) at 
873-77. See also Jaivir SINGH, “Separation of Powers and the Erosion of the ‘Right to Property’ in 
India” (2006) 17 Constitutional Political Economy 303 at 312 (“Thus, while Article 300 A has been 
perceived as a protection of private property against executive action, there is no such protection from 
the intentions of a legislature particularly in relation to ‘inadequacy of compensation’ set by the 
legislature.”. 
59
  Basu, supra note 58 at 868; see also 872. 
60
  Ibid. at 873 (Basu was critical of the repeal, but felt that the language was clear.) 
61
  Vora Saiyedbhai Kadarbhai v. Saiyed Intajam Hussen Sedumiya, (1981) 22 GLR 596 at para. 53. 
62
  Mutha Parasmal Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1981 Raj 139.  
63
  Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 Bom 366 at para. 19. 
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with compensation, or not for a public purpose, “the entire concept of rule of law would 
be redundant.”64 The Court located the right to property in Article 300A, rather than the 
fundamental rights, holding that:  
 
The legislation must be just, fair and reasonable whether protection of Arts. 14 and 19 is available or 
otherwise, and the submission that the legislation providing for deprivation of property under Art. 
300A of the Constitution must be just, fair and reasonable deserves acceptance.
65
  
 
The High Court’s reading of Article 300A also had the rather odd effect of avoiding the 
constitutional amendments that Parliament had enacted to protect economic and land 
reform legislation from judicial review. For example, the Supreme Court in Minerva 
Mills held that Article 31C could not completely exclude judicial review of legislation 
under Article 14; however, if a similar case came forward under Article 300A, the High 
Court’s judgment suggests that Article 31C would have no effect.66  
Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan was overruled by the Supreme Court, on the basis that 
Article 300A was not in force when the legislation was enacted.
67
 The Court also stated 
that, in any case, the statute was fair, just and reasonable.
68
 It thereby avoided making any 
statement on the High Court’s views on Article 300A.69 However, there is evidence that, 
if it had found it necessary to do so, it would have cast doubt on the Bombay High 
Court’s interpretation of Article 300A.70 In Bhim Singh v. Union of India, for example, 
Iyer J. was emphatic in denying that the pre-repeal right to property under Article 31(2) 
required full compensation or even fair compensation.
71
 The petitioners challenged a 
legislative cap of 2 lakhs rupees (about $US 25,000 at that time) on compensation for 
land, but Iyer J. declared that “short of paying a 'farthing for a fortune' the question of 
compensation is out of bounds for the court to investigate.”72 He said that, in the Indian 
context, where “half of humanity lives below the breadline, to regard Rs. 2 lakhs as a 
farthing is farewell to poignant facts and difficult to accept.”73 Indeed, property could be 
taken “not for a return, but for almost free, if the justice of the situation commended itself 
to the legislation to take it that way.”74  
Iyer J. also considered Article 14: on its face, there may have been a violation of its 
guarantee of formal equality, but Parliament had used the device of adding the legislation 
to the Ninth Schedule. By the First Amendment, legislation added to the Ninth Schedule 
                                                 
64
  Ibid. at para. 19.   
65
  Ibid. at para. 22. 
66
  Ibid. at para. 24.  
67
  State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, 1986 SCR (1) 707 at 729. The legislation is the 
Maharashtra Housing and Development Act, 1976, No. 28 of 1977. 
68
  Ibid. at 726.  
69
  Ibid. at 729. 
70
  See also State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, 1978 SCR (1) 641; Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. 
v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., 1983 SCR (1) 1000; Waman Rao v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (2) 1. 
71
  Bhim Singh v. Union of India 1985 SCR Supl (1) 862 [Bhim Singh]. Krishna Iyer J. delivered a 
concurring judgment, but in the short judgment for the majority, Chandrachud C.J. expressed agreement 
with Iyer J.’s reasons.  
72
  Ibid. at 881; the cap was under the Urban  Land (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act, 1976, No. 33 of 1976. 
As the claim was filed before the Amendment, the Court decided it against the prior law. 
73
  Bhim Singh, supra note 71 at 884.  
74
  Ibid. at 883.  
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was immune from review under Article 14 (or the right to property). Under the basic 
structure doctrine, the Court might have allowed review. However, in considering the 
facts, Iyer J. stated that only a violation of Article 14 that amounted to “a shocking, 
unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice” would 
make the doctrine applicable.
75
 In comparing the relief of poverty with equality under 
Article 14, he asked “[w]hich is more basic? Eradication of die-hard, deadly and 
pervasive penury degrading all human rights or upholding of the legal luxury of perfect 
symmetry and absolute equality attractively presented to preserve the status quo ante?”76 
Iyer J.’s judgment reflected a broader turn to social activism in the Court of the 
1980’s. In the landmark case Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Council,77 the Court 
considered whether the right to life in Article 21 prevented the Bombay Municipal 
Council from relocating pavement dwellers who had migrated into the city to look for 
work. Previously, Article 21 had been read as a narrow prohibition against capital 
punishment. In Tellis v. Bombay, the Supreme Court extended Article 21 to the “means of 
living”, on the basis that the right to life protects “something more than mere animal 
existence”. Accordingly, “the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those 
limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed."
78
 Hence, the Municipal Council could not 
simply evict the pavement dwellers because they lacked a formal interest in their 
dwelling spaces.  
Tellis v. Bombay is interesting because Article 21 was invoked to protect access to a 
dwelling space. To be sure, the protection was carefully circumscribed: the judgment 
does not confer a proprietary interest; at most, eviction was delayed until the pavement 
dwellers could find alternative accommodation.
79
 Indeed, in other cases, it was careful to 
ensure that Article 21 did not develop into a new form of the liberal right to property.
80
 
Nevertheless, Bombay could not treat the pavement dwellers as though they had no 
standing at all. Access to space, especially for a home, is relevant to fundamental rights; 
and the social context in which it exists is also relevant. This reflects some of the thinking 
that goes into a social democrat vision of a right to property. That is, for social democrats, 
part of the social function of property lies in the protection of access and control over 
space and resources, and a constitutional right to property limits the state’s power to 
modify existing arrangements over access and control. As such, whilst not directly about 
property, Tellis v. Bombay suggests that the Court was showing more concern for ideas of 
social obligation and solidarity, and an awareness of the relationship between access to 
resources and the capacity to lead a meaningful life.  
                                                 
75
  Ibid. at 889. 
76
  Ibid. at 890. 
77
  Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Council, 1985 SCR Supl (2) 51 [Tellis v. Bombay]; see Jessie H. 
HOHMANN, “Visions of Social Transformation and the Invocation of Housing Rights in Mumbai: The 
Struggle for the Right to Housing” (2010) 13 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 135. 
78
  Tellis v. Bombay, ibid. at 79.  
79
  Ibid. at 87.  
80
  See Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1980 SCR (3) 1159 at 1168 (Iyer J) (“The 
dichotomy between personal liberty, in Article 21, and proprietary status, in Articles 31 and 19 is plain, 
whatever philosophical justification or pragmatic realisation it may possess in political or juristic 
theory.”). See also State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, 1986 SCR (1) at 730.  
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The overall picture is therefore that, to the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court carefully 
avoided re-creating a constitutional right to compensation or substantive fairness. It did 
not reject the liberal vision outright, but neither did it advocate it with the vigour of the 
earlier period. The Bombay High Court’s judgment in Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan 
seemed anomalous. However, the political climate was changing. The exchange crisis of 
1991 led to a dramatic acceleration of the liberalisation programme. If, in the post-repeal 
period, the Court had become more receptive to redistributive policies, it now seemed 
that Congress was moving away from them. The Court soon followed. 
This became evident, in 1995, in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State Of Gujarat.
81
 In a 
key development, it treated Article 300A as a positive grant of the power of eminent 
domain. By the reasoning of Seervai, this would necessarily require a taking of property 
to serve a public purpose and to be conditional on payment of compensation. However, 
perhaps mindful of the earlier controversies, the Court was cautious on compensation. It 
held that it was only necessary to pay an amount that was not “illusory”.82 Nevertheless, 
the reasoning is not as clear as it could be, as the Court also stated that Article 300A 
“resuscitated” elements of the old right to property, but not the sections that provided for 
compensation. Hence, it followed that the argument that Article 300A incorporated an 
obligation to compensate was “untenable”.83 Plainly, there was some confusion over the 
effect of Article 300A, especially in relation to compensation. Nevertheless, behind the 
confusion, it was again clear that Article 300A was not merely a limit on executive 
power: it also enabled judicial review of legislation.  
In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, the Court ultimately decided that the legislation did not 
violate Article 300A.
84
 As with Minerva Mills, it appeared that declarations of 
unconstitutionality would be very rare in property cases. However, the judgment was 
soon followed by State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal.
85
 In this case, for the first time 
since the Forty-Fourth Amendment, the Court struck down provisions of takings 
legislation on substantive grounds. The offending provisions authorised the payment of 
compensation by installment, which the Court found “unreasonable” and hence contrary 
to Article 14.
86
 The Court did not explain why the provisions on installment payments 
were unreasonable, or why it relied on Article 14 rather than Article 300A, but it was 
clear that it was becoming more willing to scrutinise property legislation.  
In cases subsequent to State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, the Court consistently 
affirmed its power to review legislation to protect property. In a series of cases, it 
declared that Article 300A provided an independent right to property, as part of the 
conferral of the power of eminent domain. Moreover, it cast aside its earlier reticence on 
                                                 
81
  Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State Of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 142; 1994 Supp(1) SCR 807 [Jilubhai 
Nanbhai Khachar]. See Diwakar AGARWAL and Vikram RAGHAVAN, “Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v 
State Of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 142: A Review” (1996) 9 Central India Law Quarterly 96 (supporting 
the revival of a right to property); Singh, supra note 58 at 318. 
82
  Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, ibid. at para. 19.  
83
  Ibid. at para. 33; see also para. 51. 
84
  Bombay Land Revenue Code and Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1982, No. 8 
of 1982. 
85
  State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, 1995 AIR 2114. 
86
  Ibid. at para. 17. 
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compensation. In 2005, in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn Ltd v. Darius Shapur Chenai, the 
Court stated that: 
 
[h]aving regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the State in 
exercise of its power of 'eminent domain' may interfere with the right of property of a person by 
acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor 
must be paid.
87
  
 
In 2006, in State Of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak, it stated that “Article 300-A 
embodies the 'doctrine of eminent domain' which comprises of two parts, (i) acquisition 
of property in public interest; and (ii) payment of reasonable compensation therefor.”88 
More broadly, the Court stated that the regulation of property was subject to general 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In Chairman, Indore Vikas v. M/S Pure 
Industrial Cock & Chem., the Court confirmed this approach, as it declared that zoning 
classifications could not be sustained if they imposed “unreasonable restrictions”. It also 
stated that “[t]he courts must make an endeavour to strike a balance between public 
interest on the one hand and protection of a constitutional right to hold property, on the 
other.”89 Then, in M/S Entertainment Network v. M/S Super Cassette Industries Ltd. it 
declared that “[i]n terms of Article 300A of the Constitution, it [the right to property] 
may be subject to the conditions laid down therein, namely, it may be wholly or in part 
acquired in public interest and on payment of reasonable compensation.” 90  
Collectively, these cases are alike in the absence of any reasoned justification for 
importing substantive standards into Article 300A. Indeed, they do not even acknowledge 
the possibility that Article 300A does not include such standards. Plainly, they indicate a 
trend toward giving Article 300A substantive content. However, it should be noted that 
the majority of these cases were decided by a bench of only two judges, with the same 
judge (S.B. Sinha) delivering the judgment of the Court.
91
 These cases are significant, but 
it is fair to say that they do not constitute a strong line of authority. However, in K.T. 
Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,
92
 a bench of five judges
93
 delivered a detailed 
                                                 
87
  Hindustan Petroleum Corpn Ltd v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627, at para. 6 [Hindustan 
Petroleum]. 
88
  State Of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, 2006 (2) SCC 545 at para. 65 [Bihar v. PUV]. 
89
  Chairman, Indore Vikas v. M/S Pure Industrial Cock & Chem., (2007) 8 SCC 705, at para. 47 
[Chairman, IV]. 
90
  M/S Entertainment Network v. M/S Super Cassette Industries Ltd., 2008 (9) SCALE 69, at para. 77 [M/S 
Entertainment].  
91
  Hindustan Petroleum, supra note 87; Bihar v. PUV, supra note 88; Chairman IV, supra note 89; M/S 
Entertainment, supra note 90. It is interesting to note that the National Commission to Review the 
Working of the Constitution, which included a number of retired senior judges, recommended that 
Article 300-A be amended to the following: “300-A  (1) Deprivation or acquisition of property shall be 
by authority of law and only for a public purpose. (2) There shall be no arbitrary deprivation or 
acquisition of property …” (Further provisions would have covered Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes.) National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Report of the National 
Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (Ministry of Justice, 2002) at para. 3.16.2. The 
Commission did not explain why it made its recommendation, but it is worth noting that the proposed 
paragraph (2) seems to introduce the same substantive standard as found in Article 14. 
92
  K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, [2011] 13 (ADDL) SCR 636 [KT Plantation].  
93
  S.H. Kapadia, Mukundakam Sharma, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar, Anil R. Dave, JJ. 
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analysis of Article 300A confirming these developments. The reasoning and doctrine are 
not particularly clear, and are worth examining in some detail. 
 
B. K.T. Plantation, Article 300A, and the Right to Property 
 
In K.T. Plantation, the Court acknowledged that the Forty-Fourth Amendment removed 
the right to compensation from the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution.
94
 
However, it asked whether the Amendment “completely obliterated” the principles of 
eminent domain.
95
 The Court observed that Article 300A does not contain any express 
reference to the principles of eminent domain. Nevertheless, it declared that the principles 
of eminent domain, including the right to compensation, could be “inferred” into Article 
300A.
96
 
Plainly, this is a highly significant step. It is therefore remarkable that the Court 
reached made it with virtually no analysis. As explained above, it is quite clear that 
Article 300A was only intended to require legislative authority for a deprivation of 
property. The Court referred to the leading historical figures on eminent domain, such as 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Rousseau and Blackstone,
97
 as well as the Constitutions of the 
United States, Germany, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
98
 It seems that the Court did so to demonstrate that the 
Indian constitutional order is fundamentally liberal, and that such an order must have a 
justiciable right to property (even though, as the Court noted, some jurisdictions do not 
have justiciable rights to property).
 99
 Once the Court took this point of view, it seemed to 
follow that the Forty-Fourth Amendment did not remove the right to property from the 
Constitution. Instead, by moving it out of the chapter on fundamental rights, it adjusted 
the remedies and procedure that apply to a breach, but it went no further.  
The Court also considered the basic structure doctrine in the context of property. It is 
not clear why it did so: the doctrine is used to overcome a constitutional amendment that 
excludes judicial review. In K.T. Plantation, no such amendment was relevant to the case. 
However, it seemed that the Court wished to comment on the line of cases beginning with 
Minerva Mills and culminating with I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu
100
 and Glanrock 
Estate Ltd v. The State of Tamil Nadu,
101
 where it confirmed that a taking of property 
could violate fundamental rights, and that an amendment intended to insulate the relevant 
legislation from judicial review could violate the basic structure doctrine. To be sure, the 
Court has been careful to explain that it would be unusual to find that a taking could give 
                                                 
94
  Subject to the specific exceptions in Articles 30(1A) (property of educational institutions established by 
minorities) and 31A(1) (certain smallholdings under personal cultivation) of the Constitution, supra 
note 17.   
95
  K.T. Plantation, supra note 92, para. 115. 
96
  Ibid., para. 115; see also para. 121: “the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not 
expressly included in Article 300A, it can be inferred in that Article and it is for the State to justify its 
stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the 
statute and host of other factors.” 
97
  Ibid., para. 84-91. 
98
  Ibid.  
99
  Ibid., para. 84-85. 
100
  I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 AIR 861, 2007 (1) SCR 706, 2007 (2) SCC 1 [IR Coelho].  
101
  Glanrock Estate Ltd v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 10 SCC 96 [Glanrock Estate].  
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rise to a judgment that the basic structure had been undermined. Indeed, as the Court 
explained in Glanrock Estate, it is possible for a constitutional amendment to shield a 
violation of a fundamental right from judicial review without necessarily violating the 
basic structure of the Constitution. One example of particular importance for property 
concerns equality and egalitarianism. Egalitarian values are part of the basic structure of 
the Constitution: they are expressed in Article 14, but egalitarianism goes beyond Article 
14.
102
 Indeed, in some situations, formal equality under Article 14 might even conflict 
with the pursuit of a more egalitarian society.
103
 In such a case, an amendment could 
shield the legislation from review without violating the basic structure doctrine.  
Unfortunately, in K.T. Plantation, the Court’s discussion of the basic structure 
doctrine produces confusion rather than clarification. It seemed unable to make the 
fundamental distinction between the review of legislation and the review of an 
amendment that shields legislation from review. It stated that, in relation to property, 
“[o]n deletion of Article 19(1)(f) the available grounds of challenge are Article 14, the 
basic structure and the rule of law, apart from the ground of legislative competence.”104 It 
did not say whether the “challenge” is to legislation or a constitutional amendment. The 
first ground – Article 14 – is relevant to a challenge to legislation, but not necessarily to a 
challenge to a constitutional amendment (as the Court noted in Glanrock Estates). If the 
Court intended to refer to the review of amendments, Article 14 might be relevant as an 
instance of the more general principle of egalitarianism; but if so, this is properly part of 
the basic structure doctrine, which the Court identified as a separate ground.  But equally, 
if the Court was saying that Article 14 is a general ground for reviewing property 
legislation, why did it concentrate on Article 300A in the rest of its judgment? The 
second ground – the “basic structure and the rule of law” – is only relevant to the review 
of a constitutional amendment.
105
  
The third ground – “legislative competence” – could be a basis for either kind of 
review. Indeed, this is the basis of the Court’s position on Article 300A as the source of 
the power of eminent domain. If, however, the challenge is to a constitutional 
amendment, the question of competence would fall under Article 368. This provision 
gives Parliament the exclusive power to amend the Constitution. It also describes the 
process for amending the Constitution. Hence, the Court could strike down an 
amendment on the basis of a lack of competence if Parliament failed to pass it with a two-
thirds majority, as required by Article 368. The reference to legislative competence (like 
the references to Article 14, the basic structure doctrine and the rule of law) is therefore 
not incorrect, although it is ambiguous and confusing.  
The conflation in K.T. Plantation of the review of legislation and the review of 
constitutional amendments does not detract from the importance of the Court’s reading of 
Article 300A. It leaves it impossible to determine why the Court has revived the right to 
property, but no doubt that it has done so. 
                                                 
102
  See, ibid. at para. 8. 
103
  Kameshwar Singh, supra note 47, is an example. 
104
  K.T. Plantation, supra note 92, para. 134. 
105
  See Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union Of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 at para. 191: “legislation cannot be 
challenged simply on the ground of unreasonableness because that by itself does not constitute a 
ground.”  
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C. The Content of the Right to Property 
 
The Court in K.T. Plantation also considered the content of the right to property under 
Article 300A. In a significant passage, the Court described its substantive content as 
follows:  
 
Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be 
reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction 
should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The 
limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive. The legislation 
providing for deprivation of property under Article 300A must be “just, fair and reasonable” as 
understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc.
106
  
 
By holding that all laws affecting property are subject to review against general standards 
of reasonableness, the Court resurrected the pre-repeal right to property in its most 
generous interpretation.
107
 Indeed, the contrast with the comments of Iyer J. in Bhim 
Singh is quite striking.
108
 However, the Court also indicated that it would not apply these 
standards rigidly:  
 
Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a 
limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. … in each 
case, the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of 
nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, unfair or 
unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.
109
   
 
These principles are broad enough to allow a number of different approaches to 
compensation. They could, for example, lead the Court to the position Jawaharlal Nehru 
took in the Constituent Assembly debates. He agreed that full compensation should be 
paid for the “petty acquisitions” involved in small-scale public projects, but not in 
situations where the legislature embarked on "large schemes of social reform, social 
engineering etc."
110
 In such cases, the legislature would normally act because the market 
was operating in a manner that did not serve the public interest; hence, it would make 
little sense to honor the market by paying full compensation. However, he then 
commented on the threat from private power, and in particular from powerful 
monopolies, who:  
 
can crush out the little shop-keeper by their methods of business and by the fact that they have large 
sums of money at their command … he may possess property, but it may mean nothing to him, 
because some monopoly comes in the way and prevents him from the enjoyment of his property.
111
 
 
                                                 
106
  K.T. Plantation, supra note 92 at para. 122.  
107
  See the material cited supra note 1. 
108
  Supra note 71. 
109
  Ibid., paras. 121 and 122.  
110
  Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX, 1194 (10 September 1949).  
111
  Ibid., 1196. 
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Only a strong State could protect the vulnerable from monopolies and their power over 
the market. In some cases, this would require "large schemes of social reform, social 
engineering etc.", including the nationalisation of key industries.
112
 In these cases, the 
legislature would need the discretion to set compensation to ensure that it would be able 
to protect the vulnerable. Ultimately, he could not see how these two situations could be 
distinguished, and hence he argued for complete discretion for all types of takings. 
However, under the current doctrine, the Court might seek to develop principles for 
drawing a distinction between them.  
Conversely, if the Court returns to its jurisprudence of the 1950’s and 60’s, it is likely 
to say that the pursuit of social justice may justify a taking, but paying less than the 
market value for the property would be “unjust, unfair or unreasonable” to the owner. 
The Court’s recent tendency to describe property as a “human right” suggests that it is 
moving in this direction.
113
 Indeed, the language that it has used to describe the content of 
Article 300A is similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to 
property under the European Convention on Human Rights.
114
 Like the framers of the 
Indian Constitution, the framers of the European Convention avoided substantive 
guarantees in order to protect the capacity of the legislature to pursue social and 
economic legislation.
115
 Over time, however, the Court of Human Rights moved the 
Convention’s right to property closer to the liberal model. Doctrinally, the right to 
property is now subject to the same general standard of proportionality as other 
Convention rights.
116
 In the leading cases, James v. The United Kingdom
117
 and Lithgow 
v. The United Kingdom,
118
 the Court declared that the right to property required a “fair 
balance”, and this would normally require payment of an amount reasonably related to 
the value of the property.
119
 Plainly, this is similar to the formula in K.T. Plantation and 
may give some indication of the thinking of the Indian Supreme Court.  
In both James and Lithgow, as in K.T. Plantation, exceptions to the general rule of full 
compensation were permitted. In James v. The United Kingdom, the European Court of 
Human Rights suggested that the property owners did not have a claim to full 
compensation because some of the value of the property was attributable to expenditure 
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113
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by their tenants, who had been given the right to acquire the freeholds. In Lithgow, it held 
that the scale and impact of the nationalisation of an industry meant that the ordinary 
principles could not be rigidly applied. These outcomes would have been consistent with 
the position taken by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly. However, in more recent cases, 
the Court of Human Rights has become more liberal and much less willing to 
accommodate the social democrat values that led the framers to avoid including 
substantive guarantees in the right to property.
120
 In Radovici and Stănescu v. 
Romania,
121
 for example, the Court declared that a State could not require property 
owners to take on the burden of providing social justice. In relation to the regulation of 
tenancies during a housing shortage, the Court stated that: 
 
the legitimate interests of the community in such situations call for a fair distribution of the social 
and financial burden involved in the transformation and reform of the country’s housing supply.  
This burden cannot, as in the present cases, be placed on one particular social group, however 
important the interests of the other group or the community as a whole.
122
 
 
In effect, social provisioning can only be achieved through general funds. In practice, 
social welfare for the poor is set against the willingness of the wealthy to pay taxes. This 
is, of course, the classic liberal view of the right to property: governments may take 
property when authorised, but the conception of a right to property focuses on the needs 
and claims of the owner. It is free of social obligations that would allow for re-definition 
and adjustment of entitlements in the light of the social context. As such, the human 
rights conception of property becomes part of a political ideology that makes the 
furtherance of social and economic rights conditional on budgetary capacity of the State, 
rather than the dignity of the individual.
123
 By this reasoning, adequate social 
provisioning can be delayed indefinitely.
124
 
 
D. The Scope of the Right to Property 
 
K.T. Plantation raises a further question about Article 300A. The case itself dealt with the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain. But does the reasoning go further than that? 
Could it be argued that the reasoning of K.T. Plantation supports the conclusion that 
Article 300A provides a general right to property, applicable to any form of interference 
with property, including those that are not exercises of the power of eminent domain?  
On the facts, it was not necessary for the Court to address this question; nevertheless, 
there is a strong argument that the conclusion does indeed follow from its reasoning. The 
core principle of Article 300A is legality: no one can be deprived of private property 
without the authority of law. Although the Court’s immediate concern was with the 
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exercise of the power of eminent domain, the language of Article 300A and its forerunner 
in Article 31(1) demonstrate that it expresses a principle of general application. Indeed, 
the Court acknowledges this point by stating that “Article 300A enables the State to put 
restrictions on the right to property by law.” Expressed in this way, Article 300A is not 
limited to takings under the power of eminent domain. Instead, it was intended to ensure 
(at a minimum) that the deletion of Article 31(1) did not allow the executive to act 
against property without the authority of law.  
This leads to a more controversial question: does the principle of reasonableness apply 
to all forms of interference with property? Here, there are two different models that 
illustrate the importance of this question. In the United States, the takings clause provides 
a substantive guarantee (public purpose, and just compensation), but only in respect of 
exercises of the power of eminent domain.
125
 It falls under the more general right to due 
process, which applies to all forms of interference with property. However, the more 
general right is only concerned with the procedure by which public authorities purport to 
exercise power over property.
126
 If a deprivation of property does not amount to a taking, 
there is no requirement to act reasonably in a substantive sense. If this is the model under 
Article 300A, all interferences would require the authority of law, but only eminent 
domain would require substantive reasonableness.  
The second model is that of the European Convention on Human Rights. As explained 
above, the Convention right to property requires a “fair balance” for a taking of property. 
Crucially, in the landmark case Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, the Court held that the 
principle of the fair balance applies to all forms of interference with property, including 
those outside eminent domain.
127
 In Sporrong and Lönnroth, the Court considered the 
City of Stockholm’s practice of issuing specific “expropriation notices” over lengthy and 
indefinite periods. There was no taking, but the issue of the notice reduced the value of 
the property to such an extent that the absence of compensation meant that it failed to 
strike a fair balance.
128
 
If Article 300A has a similar structure to the Convention right, the general standard of 
substantive reasonableness would apply to all interferences with private property. Plainly, 
there would be some types of takings where compensation would not be necessary to 
ensure reasonableness.
129
 Indeed, there are circumstances where requiring compensation 
could defeat the purpose of a legitimate interference with private property. For example, 
it is not unreasonable to expect property owners to bear the full cost of the destruction of 
contraband in their possession.
130
 However, Article 300A would still be relevant, as it 
requires public officers in both cases to stay within the scope of their legal authority to 
act; arguably, it may also require the penalty of destruction to be proportionate to the 
offence. Similarly, with bankruptcy, it is reasonable to allow officers of the State to seize 
property for distribution amongst creditors, without compensation to the debtor (other 
than the eventual extinction of their debts); arguably, reasonableness might not justify the 
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seizure of assets of a more personal nature, but compensation would render the process of 
no real effect.
131
 Other cases fall into a grey area: when, for example, would the 
regulation of property for the public benefit impose an unreasonable burden on the 
owner? This question has vexed courts in many jurisdictions, and, if the standard of 
reasonableness applies to all forms of interference under Article 300A, it is likely to do so 
in India as well.  
 
E. The Significance of a Distinct Right to Property 
 
The Supreme Court’s revival of the right to property brings India into line with the 
constitutional law of many other States. Nevertheless, it is a remarkable development, 
given the clear language and purpose of the Forty-Fourth and earlier Amendments. Not 
only has the Court revived the right to property as a substantive right, but it has done so 
in a liberal framework. Moreover, it found it necessary to express it as a distinct right. In 
terms of the construction of legal doctrine, it is not even clear why it thought it necessary 
to turn to Article 300A. As explained above, the line of authority beginning with Maneka 
Gandhi allows petitioners to use Articles 14, 19, and 21 to protect property from 
treatment that is “arbitrary”, or not “fair, just and reasonable”. Plainly, the Maneka 
Gandhi line of cases does not turn any of these Articles into a new right to property. 
Their functions are much broader than that. Nevertheless, it is clear that a property owner 
might look to these provisions to protect its interests in some cases. In addition, as the 
Court acknowledged in K.T. Plantation, the same standard applies under Article 300A. 
Given the breadth of Articles 14, 19, and 21, why did the Court find it necessary to 
construct Article 300A as a distinct substantive guarantee of a right to property? 
The first explanation may be that the Court may feel that Articles 14, 19, and 21 leave 
gaps in the protection of property. The very fact that they are not written as rights to 
property would suggest that this is the case. However, it seems unlikely that a taking of 
property that imposed an unreasonable burden on the owner would not fall within the 
scope of Articles 14, 19 and 21. To be sure, the Court has been cautious about extending 
Article 21 to property.
132
 It is also true that Article 14, as written, is concerned with 
equality. However, in cases such Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal,
 133
 the Court has 
followed Bhagwati J.’s view that Article 14 covers any form of “arbitrary” action.134 As 
this seems to include the payment of compensation that the Court thinks inadequate, it is 
clear that Article 14 could cover the ground of Article 300A. Furthermore, as the 
regulation of property could often be brought under Article 19(1)(g) as an interference 
with the carrying on an “occupation, trade or business”, there would be few cases that 
could not be brought under one of Articles 14, 19, or 21. Indeed, in I.R. Coehlo, the Court 
affirmed the Maneka Gandhi principle that the fundamental rights in Part III form a 
comprehensive, indivisible whole. I.R. Coelho involved a challenge to land reform 
legislation under Articles 14, 19, and 21; the Court held that the case could proceed, on 
the basis that: 
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[i]t is evident that it can no longer be contended that protection provided by fundamental rights 
comes in isolated pools. On the contrary, these rights together provide a comprehensive guarantee 
against excesses by state authorities. Thus post-Maneka Gandhi's case it is clear that the 
development of fundamental rights has been such that it no longer involves the interpretation of 
rights as isolated protections which directly arise but they collectively form a comprehensive test 
against the arbitrary exercise of state power in any area that occurs as an inevitable consequence.
135
 
 
From this, it seems unlikely that there are gaps. The Court could apply Articles 14, 19, 
and 21 to cover the ground of Article 300A, if it were minded to do so. 
A second possible explanation considers the exclusions of judicial review contained in 
Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C. As explained above, in Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan, the 
Bombay High Court took the view that the exclusions do not apply to Article 300A. 
Hence, recourse to Article 300A seems to allow petitioners to side-step the constitutional 
exclusions of judicial review. This point was not discussed when the Forty-Fourth 
Amendment was discussed, perhaps because Article 300A was not expected to act as a 
constraint on legislative action. Neither was it discussed by the Supreme Court in the 
appeal in Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan or subsequent cases. However, if it is correct, 
Parliament could still amend Article 300A, or Articles 31A, 31B, or 31C, so as to extend 
the exclusions, but the tactical advantages of bringing a case under Article 300A rather 
than Articles 14, 19 and 21 would remain until such time as an amendment is enacted.  
Plainly, the Supreme Court is convinced of the necessity of a distinct right to property, 
even though the Indian constitutional system provides alternative grounds of protection. 
One could argue that the Supreme Court has fallen into the “formalist trap”, to use 
Gregory Alexander’s expression. As Alexander argues, the existence or form of a 
constitutional right to property does not determine the vulnerability of property to 
legislative action.
136
 Other doctrines and principles and the "background 
nonconstitutional legal and political traditions and culture" can provide owners with the 
security of a right to property.
137
 This certainly seems to be the case in India, even if the 
potential advantages of using Article 300A to circumvent Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C are 
taken into account. It seems that the real reason for locating a right to property in Article 
300A is more symbolic. Several generations of judges have held onto the liberal idea that 
property defines an area of autonomy that should be safeguarded from state power. For 
these judges, property is not merely an instrument for enabling the exercise of other 
forms of autonomy. The zone of autonomy protected by property law has a quality that is 
distinct and important in itself. As such, it should be recognised as a distinct right, even if 
creative interpretation would protect property through other fundamental rights. In effect, 
recognising a right to property as a distinct right has a declarative and educative role in 
addition to its instrumental role in constitutional litigation. 
 
III. THE REVIVAL OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN INDIAN POLITICS 
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The revival of the right to property has attracted relatively little attention in political and 
legal circles. Political rhetoric over property is much more muted than in earlier periods, 
partly because none of the leading parties have called for the redistribution of land or the 
nationalisation of key industries in recent years.
138
 Indeed, there has been some 
commentary calling for reversal of the Forty-Fourth Amendment, even though the right to 
property as it stood immediately before the Amendment was weaker than the right that 
has been constructed from Article 300A (and Article 14).
139
 The Amendment has even 
been the subject of public interest litigation: in Sanjiv Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 
the Supreme Court dismissed a petition for a declaration the Amendment’s repeal of the 
right to property was contrary to the basic structure.
140
 This was noted in the press, along 
with the Court’s recent declarations that property is a human right.141 However, the 
debate has been remarkably quiet, especially in comparison with the debates before 
World War II and during Indira Gandhi’s governments before the Emergency. In both 
periods, Congress felt threatened by the rise of mass movements on the left, and made 
promises of land and economic reform helped to capture support from more radical 
parties.
142
 By contrast, there has very limited mobilisation on the left in recent years, even 
though one might argue that the social conditions for it are present. Indeed, the 
distribution of wealth has become more concentrated in recent years,
143
 and has been 
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blamed in part for the lack of progress in public health and education.
144
 Peasant and 
agricultural labor movements still exist, and there is still a continuing communist 
insurgency in West Bengal. However, these movements have been unable to secure 
significant changes in national policies on wealth distribution or social provisioning.
145
 
The failure of these movements to gain influence in mainstream politics, and the 
association of economic growth with liberalisation, make it unlikely that socialist or 
redistributive policies would become central to the policies of the main parties.  
The absence of an influential mass movement from the left may explain why social 
democrat ideas of solidarity have little impact on national politics. The general picture 
across India is one in which the middle classes do not look to the State as a source of 
employment, education or health, and do not see value in public sector social 
provisioning as part of a political “bargain”.146 By contrast, at independence, a growing 
state sector in industry was expected to provide new opportunities for employment for the 
educated middle class, and was supported by them for that reason.
147
 Currently, many of 
the middle class have sufficient wealth to provide for themselves without resort to state 
services; where they do rely on public services, they often monopolise provision and 
direct investment.
148
 For example, state investment in primary and secondary schools is 
low and the quality of education is poor. However, investment is greater in higher 
education, where the middle class dominate.
 149
 Patrick Heller argues that: 
 
[i]f the Congress System allowed for class accommodation, liberalization has polarized class 
positions. The dominant classes, which benefited the most from developmental investments of the 
Nehruvian state (especially in state employment and support for higher education), now actively 
reject the very notion of the affirmative, equity-enhancing state.
150
  
 
It is not even clear that there is any shared sense of the meaning of social justice or in the 
value of solidarity, whether or not it is expressed in political life. Hence, the brief 
statements in K.T. Plantation that social justice might justify something less than full 
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compensation were not made in a context in which this might be understood.  Instead of a 
spirit of solidarity:  
 
[o]n a day-to-day basis, the Indian citizen engages with the State either as a client or as a member of 
a group, but not as a rights-bearing citizen. Engagement is predicated on exchanges, not rights. 
Demands on the State are made through bribes, by appeals to caste or communal solidarities or 
through the influence of powerful interest groups.
151
 
 
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that the Court and Parliament lost interest 
in social justice in recent years. Congress won a large block of seats in the Lok Sabha in 
2004 and formed a coalition government with a number of other center-left parties. The 
coalition, known as the United Progressive Alliance, produced a “Common Minimum 
Programme” that promised improvements in social welfare.152 This included greater land 
security for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and a promise that existing land 
ceilings and redistribution legislation would be implemented. The general orientation of 
the Common Minimum Programme was compatible with much of the Court’s activity in 
this period. Indeed, recourse to the Court has been an important tactic for “policy 
entrepreneurs” with an interest in social justice, with success before the Court often 
providing the basis for legislation directed at the relief of poverty.
153
 For example, public 
interest litigation helped to advance progressive legislation such as the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005,
154
 the Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act, 2009,
155
 and the National Food Security Act, 2013.
156
 
However, the impact of these developments is difficult to assess. While it is clear that 
neither the Supreme Court nor Parliament is blind to the issues of social justice, the 
broader picture is ambiguous. Varun Gauri has demonstrated that success rates in 
fundamental rights cases for socially advantaged groups has steadily increased over the 
last fifty years; by contrast, success rates for disadvantaged groups have declined.
157
 
Moreover, judgments on social issues have an ad hoc quality that makes it difficult to a 
co-ordinate other legislative and administrative actions.
158
 Some of these difficulties are 
felt most acutely at the local level, where implementation takes place. The result is that, 
like land redistribution in the first decades after Independence, progress can depend on 
the willingness of local elites to support change. 
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It is therefore not yet clear whether these innovations mark a lasting change in the 
politics of redistribution. In general, the legislation uses forms of indirect and limited 
redistribution to address poverty, rather than direct forms of redistribution. As John 
Harriss observes, the emphasis is more on “the provision of social welfare, or social 
protection — a ‘safety net,’ substantially funded from enhanced tax revenues — than it is 
on social development.”159 As observed above, the risk is that social justice is 
subordinated to the willingness of the better-off to acquiesce to higher taxes, and yet this 
is the position that the Court seems to be moving toward.
160
 Indeed, some commentators 
have noted that measures to improve social provisioning are followed by measures that 
enable privatisation. For example, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory 
Education Act, 2009 was soon followed by Foreign Education Institutions (Regulation of 
Entry and Operations) Bill, 2010, which would have allowed for greater exclusivity of 
tertiary education.
161
 Overall, legislation seeks to ameliorate the very worst effects of the 
market economy, but without building a broader base of solidarity and social obligation 
and without seeking to break down concentrations of wealth. 
The dominance of causes that favor the better-off has, in some cases, directly 
increased land insecurity of the poor. Over the last decade or so, there have been a 
number of controversial large-scale evictions from land. Most of these have been in 
support of a planned development, with many owned and operated by private 
enterprise.
162
 However, not all developments have been private: the Narmada Dams 
project is probably the best-known example of a public project that has resulted in 
widespread evictions. Estimates vary, but it is estimated that many tens of thousands of 
people have been displaced or lost livelihoods as a result of the construction of an 
extensive network of dams and canals on the Narmada River system.
163
  
Some evictions have not been for development: for example, in 2002, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests ordered states to remove “encroachers” on forest land, in order 
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to pursue environmental objectives.
164
 As a result, large numbers of indigenous peoples 
were removed from their traditional areas.
165
 Similarly, in Almitra H. Patel v. Union of 
India, the Court seemed to regard slum clearance as the solution to urban sanitation 
problems, as it issued orders for the removal of many of Delhi’s slum dwellers without 
requiring prior guarantees of adequate substitute housing.
166
 In effect, the presence of the 
poor seems, by itself, to threaten the quality of life expected by the better-off. These 
expectations have been expressed through Article 21 as a right to a safe environment; in 
Almitra H. Patel, the right to a safe environment was implicitly given priority over right 
to livelihood. Even so, environmental objectives are not given the highest priority by the 
Court. Prashant Bhushan observes that:  
 
when environmental protection comes into conflict with socio-economic rights of the poor and the 
marginalized, the poor usually get the short shrift and, two, when environmental protection comes 
into conflict with powerful vested commercial and corporate interests or what is perceived by the 
court to be ‘development’, environmental protection is given the short shrift.167  
 
In practice, the Supreme Court has been much more reluctant to order the eviction of 
large commercial enterprises for environmental reasons than the poor.
168
  
These evictions are often especially harsh because resettlement and rehabilitation 
packages are insufficient. Implementation of packages is poor, and in many cases they do 
not apply to many of the displaced.
169
 Compensation, when it is available, often does not 
provide for the loss of social capital associated with the loss of community.
170
 As Article 
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31 was often raised in the context of land redistribution, one might ask whether the 
revival of the right to property might provide a basis for challenging land grabs. 
However, is not clear how far recent evictions can be attributed to the weakness of 
expropriatory legislation, and especially to weaknesses that might be challenged under 
Article 300A. For example, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 required compensation at 
market value
171
 with an additional solatium of up to 30 percent,
172
 and only allowed 
takings for a “public purpose”.173 On its face, this appears to satisfy the requirements of 
Article 300A, as set out in K.T. Plantation. More recently, the Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 was enacted to strengthen the position of 
landowners and occupiers.
174
 Before an acquisition takes place under the Act, a “Social 
Impact Assessment Study” must be completed, to determine issues regarding the purpose 
of acquisition and the rights of affected families.
175
 Compensation is considerably more 
generous than under the 1894 Act: owners of land in rural areas are entitled to a 
minimum of four times the market value of the land; in urban areas, the entitlement is 
double the market value.
176
 Rehabilitation must be provided for all “affected families”, 
whether or not they own land that is acquired.
177
 One important innovation requires an 
acquisition for private companies to receive the prior consent of at least 80 percent of 
“affected families”; in the case of acquisitions for “public private partnership projects”, 
the figure is 70 percent.
178
 
These are significant measures, but whether the new Act will have the desired impact 
is uncertain. Critics have asked whether a market-based standard for compensation will 
help the very poor if reliable information on prices for land is lacking.
179
 Market 
valuation may not reflect the value of the location to occupants, especially if it is the basis 
of access to a community that provides economic opportunity and social support.
180
 In 
any case, where land use and occupation is treated as illegal (as in Almitra H. Patel), 
there is no need to compensate for land; whether rehabilitation is required for the loss of a 
livelihood that depends on illegal access is uncertain. The new consent requirement is 
significant, but given that the protests over the use of the old legislation often concerned 
oppressive or corrupt practices, there is the risk that it will make occupiers more 
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vulnerable to coercive tactics.
181
 More worrying is the lack of institutional reform: as 
Namita Wahi has argued, the arbitrariness of land acquisition proceedings has been a 
serious issue in India, and legal reform without institutional reform will do little to 
address the crony capitalism and collusion with the governing class and industry that puts 
the most vulnerable at risk.
182
 
Over the longer term, the impact of the Act and other legislation will depend on the 
role of solidarity and social justice in Indian political life, as well as institutional 
development. For this reason, it seems unlikely that the revived right to property will 
contribute to the development of a more progressive agenda. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Indian politics is characterised by a confusing mix of liberalisation and social concern. 
However, measures to protect the poor, such as the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013, rarely threaten the interests of the better-off. Indeed, it is worth 
noting that none of the cases leading to the revival of a right to property concerned land 
grabs aimed at weaker parties: instead, as with the original Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the 
revived right to property is far more likely to be invoked by those with more extensive 
property holdings.  For example, I.R. Coelho, Glanrock Estates and K.T. Plantation 
concern long-running challenges to land reform legislation.
183
 As in the pre-Kesavananda 
era, the right to property is more likely to be employed by those who seek to challenge 
progressive laws. Whether this proves controversial, and whether the judges will find 
themselves blamed for a lack of progress on social justice, remains to be seen. However, 
with economic liberalisation still dominating Indian policy, it seems unlikely that the 
judges will find themselves under pressure from their political counterparts, as least in the 
near future. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on liberal entitlement, 
rather than solidarity or social obligation, is likely to deny the new right to property of 
relevance in cases where social justice is paramount. 
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